Kann man die Gebrauchstheorie der Bedeutung in der Semantik gebrauchen?

The following article deals with some aspects of special theories of meaning – namely those which consider the meaning of a linguistic sign as a function of its use. Although this approach to meaning is commonly attributed to Wittgenstein, I do not aim at an interpretation or exegesis of this philosopher but rather at a systematic discussion of meaning-as-use-theories. In the first section, I discuss the very notion of a theory of meaning. The next section provides a list of criteria which a theory of meaning should fulfill in order to be a meaning-as-use-theory. The formal architecture of semantic theories is discussed in the third section and – dealing with the simpler case of a referential theory of meaning as an example – the fourth section explains how semantic theories are given a theoretical underpinning by being interpreted within a theory of meaning. The same is done for the case of meaning-as-use-theories in the final section

“The whole is greater than the part.” Mereology in Euclid's Elements

The present article provides a mereological analysis of Euclid’s planar geometry as presented in the first two books of his Elements. As a standard of comparison, a brief survey of the basic concepts of planar geometry formulated in a set-theoretic framework is given in Section 2. Section 3.2, then, develops the theories of incidence and order (of points on a line) using a blend of mereology and convex geometry. Section 3.3 explains Euclid’s “megethology”, i.e., his theory of magnitudes. In Euclid’s system of geometry, megethology takes over the role played by the theory of congruence in modern accounts of geometry. Mereology and megethology are connected by Euclid’s Axiom 5: “The whole is greater than the part.” Section 4 compares Euclid’s theory of polygonal area, based on his “Whole-Greater-Than-Part” principle, to the account provided by Hilbert in his Grundlagen der Geometrie. An hypothesis is set forth why modern treatments of geometry abandon Euclid’s Axiom 5. Finally, in Section 5, the adequacy of atomistic mereology as a framework for a formal reconstruction of Euclid’s system of geometry is discussed

Wieviel Logik braucht die Semantik? Ein Problem (nicht nur) für die wahrheitstheoretische Semantik

The present paper is a closer examination of that version of so-called "truth-theoretic semantics" which is developed by Larson and Segal (1995). Generally, the claim of truth-functional semantics is that the semantic meta-theory of an object language is exhausted by an adequate theory of truth for this language. Here the measure of adequacy is Tarski's celebrated "criterion T", which requires for each object language sentence A a sentence (of a special form) stating the truth-conditions for A. Larson and Segal combine the truth-theoretic view on semantics with a modular approach to linguistics. They stipulate a semantic module in which the truth-conditions for the object language sentences are derived. Since the "logic module" is, according to Larson and Segal, separated from the semantic module, these derivations can only make quite limited use of logical means. In the present paper I shall demonstrate that even in one of the most primitive sample theories which Larson and Segal develop in their monography, it is necessary to use much more of logic than they are ready to admit. Finally, I will set up and comment on a general formulation of the problem involved here, namely: how much logic is necessary in an adequate semantics

Kann man die Gebrauchstheorie der Bedeutung in der Semantik gebrauchen?

The following article deals with some aspects of special theories of meaning – namely those which consider the meaning of a linguistic sign as a function of its use. Although this approach to meaning is commonly attributed to Wittgenstein, I do not aim at an interpretation or exegesis of this philosopher but rather at a systematic discussion of meaning-as-use-theories. In the first section, I discuss the very notion of a theory of meaning. The next section provides a list of criteria which a theory of meaning should fulfill in order to be a meaning-as-use-theory. The formal architecture of semantic theories is discussed in the third section and – dealing with the simpler case of a referential theory of meaning as an example – the fourth section explains how semantic theories are given a theoretical underpinning by being interpreted within a theory of meaning. The same is done for the case of meaning-as-use-theories in the final section